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EA - Mr. Green

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CSS/AFR

December 23, 1969

EA/ACA - Paul H. Kreisberg

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Draft Opening Statement and Contingency Guidance  
for Possible Warsaw Meeting

Its authority to:

( ) CLASSIFIED as \_\_\_\_\_, OADR

( ) DOWNGRADED TO ( ) E or ( ) C, OADR

1. I attach a draft opening statement for Ambassador Stoessel's use should the Chinese agree to resume our Ambassadorial-level meetings in Warsaw. It is our turn to speak first, and I think the draft we have will set the tone for the meeting as we described it in our supplementary memorandum to you last Friday. I assume our main objectives are to test the Chinese air to keep the door open for subsequent meetings. Our draft is designed for this purpose, and I believe Ambassador Stoessel should be given considerable discretion to probe and inquire into anything the Chinese may say.

2. We anticipate, however, that the Chinese will be more interested in hearing what we have to say than in advancing positions of their own, and will probably limit their own opening statement to two or three major topics. If past experience offers us any guide to the future, the Chinese will come with a very restrictive brief from which they will not be able to deviate. We also assume they will start from a tough line with little light to encourage the listener, but they may throw out a tickler or two designed to interest us.

a) U.S. military presence on Taiwan - This topic is covered in our opening statement, and I would anticipate simply reiterating the points we made in the opener.

b) Agreement on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence - The Chinese might propose that our two Governments reach an agreement based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. You will recall that they hinted at this approach in their November 25, 1968,

Pic Chisem - 25

SECRET/NO DIS

statement proposing a meeting on February 20 of this year. Should they raise the issue, it almost certainly will be in the context of Taiwan, and the clear implication would be that a U.S. statement of respect for the PRC's territorial integrity and non-interference in its internal affairs would amount to abandoning our present policy on Taiwan. Nevertheless, we would see such a Chinese move as having positive overtones, and I would suggest that Ambassador Stoessel probe as far as he can any interesting aspects of a Chinese formulation, and indicate that the Chinese position will be referred to the U.S. Government for further consideration.

c) The third topic almost certain to be raised is the question of violation of PRC sea and airspace and incidents involving Chinese vessels in the Tonkin Gulf. Our record on this subject since the last meeting is quite good. We will be equipped to refute specific allegations, and we will suggest that if this is a problem of real concern for them, we agree to set up means to investigate jointly such incidents in the future and seek to avoid their recurrence. We will not respond to charges concerning pilotless reconnaissance aircraft.

3. In addition to the above three topics, the Chinese may also discuss the following:

a) U.S.-Soviet Collusion - We approached this subject indirectly in our opening statement through our discussion of disarmament and our desire to improve relations with all countries. We plan to prepare more specific contingency language denying their allegations and drawing on various public statements by U.S. officials.

b) Viet-Nam and U.S. presence in Southeast Asia - The Chinese may attack our Vietnamization policy and deny our professions of peaceful intent in the area. Again, we would reiterate the substance of our opening remarks, and would seek to keep the focus on an over-all reduction of tension in the area rather than getting into the specifics of

Viet-Nam itself. Should the Chinese indicate that no settlement in Viet Nam is possible without Chinese participation, we would simply take note of their position and offer to convey their views to Washington.

c) Trade and Travel - Although a less likely contingency, the Chinese may mention our initiatives on trade and travel, possibly denigrating them as of little consequence. We would characterize them as of importance, less for their immediate impact than as a concrete expression of our attitudes, and would suggest that we would welcome a favorable response such as admitting American businessmen or journalists to the Canton Trade Fair as an indication that Peking is prepared to move farther in this field.

d) United Nations - Peking may attack us for blocking its entry into the UN and demand that if we genuinely want to improve relations we stop this practice. We would respond as briefly as possible, citing this year's vote as evidence that it is not only the United States who opposes the Albanian resolution and arguing that our position is consistent with our present relationships, not only with the GRC, but with the PRC as well.

4. The foregoing make up the topics most likely to arise. Since they will all be cast in a generally hostile tone, we take it as a general rule of thumb that the fewer subjects raised by the Chinese, the more positive the meeting. We consider it highly unlikely that there will be the sweeping attacks on us that characterized one or two of the meetings during the Cultural Revolution.

5. Depending on Peking's response to our suggestion's concerning the site for this meeting, we will also have a separate statement, probably to be included in our opening remarks, concerning our views on a future meeting place.

Attachment: Draft Statement.

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(2)  
SECRET/NODIS

Introduction

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires. Today marks the first opportunity for both you and myself to represent our respective governments in the formal series of Ambassadorial-level talks that began nearly fifteen years ago. Nearly two years have elapsed since the 134th meeting, two years during which many important changes have occurred in the world. It is my Government's hope that today will mark a new beginning in our relationship, and that the interruption in our discussions can be turned into an advantage enabling us to take a fresh and constructive look at the whole range of possibilities for the improvement of relations between our two countries.

Undeniably there are ~~serious~~ differences between the <sup>way</sup> [outlooks and attitudes of] our two governments. <sup>how handle our affairs and look at the world</sup> These differences need not, however, prevent us from taking practical steps to eliminate [many of the] barriers to [better] understanding <sup>which</sup> [would be in the interests of] our two peoples. <sup>could benefit</sup> President Nixon in his inaugural address said, "After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation. Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines

SECRET/NODIS

of communication will be open. Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, this statement by the President applies to all nations, and on April 21 of this year Secretary of State Rogers stated specifically, "We shall take initiatives to reestablish more normal relations with Communist China."

#### Posture in SEA

Certain events of the past two years may make it easier for us to enter a more constructive phase in our relations. As we entered 1963 our actions in support of South Viet-Nam and our other Asian allies had resulted in the steady growth of American military presence in the area. Nevertheless, we had assured your Government that our actions in meeting our commitments to other Asian governments represented no threat to the People's Republic of China and we had pledged to halt the bombing of North Viet-Nam once there were signs that this would lead to meaningful negotiations. This we have done, and negotiations, which we <sup>phase - second session</sup> are still hopeful will be productive, were begun in Paris. During his Asian visit last year, President Nixon made it clear that, as the countries of Southeast Asia became better able to assume the burden of their own security, the United States presence in the area would

be reduced, and that, in the final analysis, the responsibility for a nation's viability can be borne only by that nation itself. Since that time, the President has announced the withdrawal of 110,000 American troops from Viet-Nam and has announced that we are prepared to withdraw ~~all~~ <sup>some</sup> of our forces as rapidly as circumstances permit.

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the United States has no intention of attempting, either unilaterally or in concert with others, to exclude the People's Republic of China from developing normal, friendly relations with its Asian neighbors and pursuing its own legitimate national interests in this area. Nevertheless, my Government <sup>is being asked to take account</sup> [cannot ignore the expressions] of concern voiced by other Southeast Asian states at what they consider to be [unwarranted] <sup>as there is a question of interference</sup> interference in their internal affairs by the People's Republic of China. Whatever constructive contribution your Government can make toward reaching a just and equitable peace in the area and in easing the legitimate concerns of other Asian governments <sup>in their national security</sup> would lead toward a goal I

think we both seek: a reduced American military presence along the southern border of China and a reduction of military tension in the area.

Proposals for Improved Contacts

Over the past fifteen years both of our Governments have advanced a number of proposals designed to improve relations and reduce tensions between our two countries. Regrettably, with the exception of the joint agreed announcement of September 10, 1955, we have been unable to reach agreement on any of these proposals. Your side, particularly during the early period of these talks, made a number of proposals including agreements on trade, the renunciation of the use of force, the exchange of newsmen, and a judicial assistance agreement. As recently as November 25, 1968, your proposal for the resumption of these meetings referred to the desirability of concluding an agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. My Government has proposed a number of measures, including the exchange of reporters, scholars, scientists and scientific information, the regularization of postal and telecommunications accounts and the discussion of matters pertaining to disarmament. We are prepared to consider with



SECRET/NOJIS

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you any of these <sup>subjects</sup> ~~matters~~ or any new topics your Government would like to propose. These are ~~all~~ concrete <sup>matters</sup> ~~issues~~ on which we feel that early and meaningful progress can be achieved. Perhaps even more important, however, is the achievement through our ~~frank~~ discussions at these meetings of [a better] understanding of <sup>between</sup> our two Governments' <sup>on the one</sup> objectives in Asia, <sup>their</sup> ~~including the limits of these objectives~~, and our mutual acceptance of the fact that an improvement in relations <sup>or</sup> ~~between us is~~ <sup>serve</sup> ~~in the interests of~~ both our countries. It is my Government's sincere belief that [this] substantive political dialogue can [and should be a significant] <sup>contribution</sup> ~~contribution~~ toward this goal.

#### Trade

Since coming to office in January 1969, President Nixon has taken several [unilateral] <sup>and</sup> actions that <sup>will be</sup> ~~give~~ <sup>can be</sup> concrete expression to our hope that barriers to <sup>the way</sup> ~~normal~~ <sup>toward</sup> ~~intercourse~~ between our two peoples <sup>can</sup> gradually be lowered. On July 21 of last year my Government eased <sup>its restrictions</sup> [its restrictions on trade and travel relating] to the People's Republic of China <sup>and amended slightly its long standing trade restrictions</sup>. On December 19 a further and more significant <sup>amendment</sup> ~~reduction~~ in our trade controls was announced. We now are prepared, should you be

SECRET/NOJIS

interested. to discuss ~~[the whole question of]~~ trade between our two countries, and the settlement of ~~all~~ outstanding obligations, including the postal and telecommunications accounts which we suggested be settled in 1968.

### Taiwan

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires. ~~[Without doubt the single most complex problem existing between our two sides is~~ *the views of your government and mine which reflect the*

~~the question of]~~ Taiwan and the United States' relationship with the Republic of China, *these affairs are so conciliable* During these

*our previous* meetings you have accused the United States of occupying

Taiwan and of interfering in the internal affairs of China. [I would like to make clear,] Mr. Chargé d'Affaires,

[that] the United States will continue to maintain [both its] friendly relations with the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan and *consider itself committed* [its commitment] to that

Government to assist it in defending Taiwan and the

Pescadores from *military aggression* attack. However, The United States'

*performance in its commitment will be* position in this regard is without prejudice to any

future peaceful settlement *into which* between the Republic of China

on Taiwan and the People's *in fact, in future, will be entered* Republic of China. I can

assure you, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, that the United

States *will* does not seek to detach any part of Chinese

SECRET/NODIS

*This, however, is a limited obligation  
commitment limited to defense of an area ... present  
legal status of which is regarded as unsettled by several govern-  
ments, including your own.*

SECRET/NODIS

*We are in a position to demonstrate our determination to maintain stability in the Western Pacific area.*

territory, including Taiwan, ~~but it will not stand idly~~  
~~by if confronted with a situation which could lead to~~  
~~large scale hostilities in the Western Pacific area.~~  
~~In this same spirit we~~ will not support and will  
strongly oppose any offensive military action by the  
Republic of China against the mainland. The limited  
U.S. military presence on Taiwan is not a threat to  
the security of your Government, and it is our hope  
that as peace and stability in Asia grow we can  
~~or we can remove entirely~~  
reduce those facilities on Taiwan that we now have.

Disarmament

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires. The problem of controlling  
the testing and use of weapons of mass destruction is a  
vital question for the peoples of every country. Thus  
far, agreement has been reached on the banning of  
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and an agreement  
on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been signed  
by 93 nations. On October 25 of last year the United  
States and the Soviet Union announced the decision to  
commence talks on strategic arms limitation. These  
important actions are not designed to perpetuate the  
nuclear monopoly of the United States and the Soviet  
Union or/any other country. <sup>to threaten</sup> The United States has  
stated as clearly as possible that it does not intend  
to interfere in the disputes of others or seek to gain

SECRET/NODIS

advantage from them. Neither do we intend, however, to allow ourselves to be deterred from pursuing a long-term course of progressively developing better relations with all countries, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We think strategic arms limitation is a matter of vital concern to the welfare of both of our peoples and would welcome an expression of interest on the part of your Government in commencing bilateral discussions between our two Governments on this subject. We also believe that the burden of arms spending fairly and is shared by all nations.

Prisoners We would welcome your interest in the release of our prisoners.

Mr. Charge d'Affaires. My Government and the people

of the United States welcomed the release on December 7 of Bessie Hope Donald and Simon Baldwin, who inadvertently entered Chinese territorial waters while sailing from Hong Kong to Macau. There remains, however, the long-standing question of the remaining Americans being held in prison by your authorities. I recognize that we have held differing interpretations of the meaning of our joint agreed announcement of September 10, 1955. Your consistent emphasis that this is a so-called "internal matter" for your country in which we have no right to interfere and your Government's refusal, without explanation, to provide even the simplest information as

to whether certain individuals are in your custody or are alive or dead, <sup>needless to say</sup> has not, I believe, <sup>been</sup> consistent with any interest in lessening] tensions between our two countries. The question of United States citizens imprisoned or missing in China is one of great concern to the American people and their Government. [Forward movement on this issue, either through the] Release of those now held or, at minimum, [through] permission for visits by family members, would <sup>be</sup> signal the approach of a more] constructive <sup>move toward relaxing of</sup> [phase in the] relations between our two countries. With this in mind, I have been instructed to <sup>per. for it</sup> [inform] your Government <sup>that you receive</sup> [of our willingness to send] a special American representative to Peking <sup>who would</sup> [to] discuss the issue in depth and, <sup>who would</sup> ~~if possible,~~ <sup>to</sup> visit the prisoners.

### Conclusion

In closing, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, I would like to restate once again my Government's <sup>as up point must even</sup> concern at the length of time that has elapsed between this meeting and the previous one, and our hope that regular contacts can be resumed at much more frequent intervals.